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Abstract 
 
A common belief in both academic and policy circles is that capital flows to the 
emerging periphery are excessive and ending in crises.  One of the most frequently 
mentioned culprits is the cycles of monetary easing and tightening in the financial 
center.  Also, many focus on the role of crises in the financial center, pointing to 
excess international borrowing predating crises in the financial center and global 
retrenchment in capital flows in its aftermath.  I re-examine these views using a 
newly-constructed database on capital flows spanning two hundred years.  
Extending the study of capital flows to the first episode of financial globalization 
has two major advantages: During this episode, monetary policy in the financial 
center is constrained by the adherence to the Gold Standard, thus providing a 
benchmark for capital flow cycles in the absence of an active role of central banks 
in the financial centers. Second, panics in the financial center are rare disasters that 
need to be examined in a longer historical episode.  I find that boom-bust capital 
flow cycles in the periphery are milder in the second episode of financial 
globalization when the financial center follows a cyclical monetary policy.  Also, 
cyclical monetary policy in the financial center is far more pronounced in times of 
crises in the financial center, cutting short capital flow bonanzas in the periphery 
and injecting liquidity in the aftermath of the crisis. 
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I. Introduction 
The booms and busts in international capital flows since the restart of capital mobility in 
the 1970s have attracted a lot of attention in both academic and policy circles.  Many suggest that 
capital flow bonanzas are excessive, ending in crises, and leading to protracted declines in 
international issuance.1  While the culprits behind the boom-bust cycles are many, the most 
frequently mentioned are the cycles of monetary easing and tightening in the financial centers.  It 
is further argued that these monetary cycles trigger highly synchronized international capital flows 
unrelated to countries’ specific macroeconomic conditions, the so-called global financial cycle.2  
The empirical research on the role of monetary policy in the financial center on 
international capital flow cycles focuses on the easing in the mid-1970s, the one in the early 1990s, 
and most recently the one in the early 2000s.  With just a few cycles, it is hard to pinpoint the role 
of monetary policy in the financial centers on the rest of the world. This is especially so because 
these cycles coincide with other worldwide shocks, such as the oil shocks of the 1970s, the creation 
of the European Monetary Union in the 1990s, or the savings glut in East Asia in the early 2000s. 
Another aspect of booms and busts in capital flows that has attracted attention more 
recently is the role of crises in the financial center.  Many have pointed to the global retrenchment 
in capital flows in the aftermath of the 2008 Subprime Crisis in the United States (see, for example, 
Boussière, Schmidt, and Valla, 2016).  This slowdown in international borrowing has been 
accompanied by a protracted collapse in the global economy quite different from the one following 
previous capital flow bonanzas and busts.   While the boom-bust borrowing cycle in Latin 
America, Asia, Russia, and Turkey in the 1990s also ended with crises, those crises were short-
lived with the periphery rapidly rebounding.  Importantly, those crises erupted amid highly liquid 
international capital markets with a healthy financial center and a growing world economy, with 
vulnerabilities only present in the crisis countries.    In contrast, the 2008 crisis had the financial 
center at its epicenter, with international capital markets collapsing and the world economy coming 
to a standstill.  It is hard to draw general conclusions about crises with the financial center at its 
epicenter from just examining the crisis of 2008.   
                                                          
1 See, for example the IMF World Economic Outlook (2016); Broner, Didier, Erce, and Schmukler (2013); Forbes 
and Warnock (2012); Ghosh, Qureshi, Kim, and Zalduendo (2014); Reinhart and Reinhart (2009). 
2 See, for example, Rey (2015). 
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In this paper, I study international capital flow cycles during a far larger episode. I look at 
the first episode of financial globalization that starts with the end of the Napoleonic Wars in the 
early 19th century and ends with the Great Depression in 1931 when barriers to international capital 
flows and trade are erected around the globe as well as the second episode of financial globalization 
that starts with the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in the 1970s.  Studying the dynamics of 
capital flows during these two episodes has two advantages.  First, during the first episode of 
financial globalization, monetary policy in the financial center is constrained by the adherence to 
the Gold Standard, providing a benchmark for capital flow cycles in the absence of an active role 
of central banks in the financial centers.  Second, panics in the financial center are rare disasters.3  
Thus, to understand the empirical regularities of this type of global crises, we need to look at a 
longer historical episode.  The first episode of financial globalization spanning more than 100 
years is witness to major crises in the financial center, such as the London panic in 1825, the world 
crisis in 1873 fueled by the collapse of financial markets in continental Europe, the 1890 Baring 
Crisis in London, and the crisis following the collapse of financial markets in New York and 
London in 1929.    
I constructed a new database of international capital flows spanning two hundred years.  
The data for the first episode of financial globalization was collected in London, Paris, Frankfurt 
and Berlin, and New York, the financial centers of the 19th and early 20th centuries, using 
information in archives, prospectuses, annual reports of the stock markets, and financial 
newspapers of those times.  The database collected includes public international issuance (central 
governments, provinces/states, and municipalities) as well as international issuance by private 
financial and non-financial corporations.  The database is granular.  It includes data on every bond 
and share floated in international capital markets.  For bonds, it includes the amount issued, the 
interest rate, the issue price, the amortization characteristics, the underwriting banks, as well as 
information on the markets those bonds were floated.  For shares, the database includes the amount 
issued, the price of issue, as well as whether shares are ordinary or preferred.  A similar database 
is constructed for the episode 1970-2015. The database for the 1970s is collected from the Archives 
of the World Bank while the data starting in 1980s is from various digital databases as well as data 
from the IMF, the Institute of International Finance, and Central Banks.  The database constructed 
for the period 1970-2015 is also granular and includes all the bonds, syndicated loans, and shares 
                                                          
3 See Barro (2006). 
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floated in international capital markets.  The database on international issuance is complemented 
with a database on economic fundamentals, including economic activity, commodity prices, terms 
of trade, world interest rates, inflation, and monetary statistics, all going back to 1820.    
The focus of attention in this study is on Latin American countries.  These countries started 
to participate in international capital markets right after independence from Spain and Portugal in 
the first twenty years of the 19th century.  I study the characteristics of booms and crashes in 
international gross primary issuance for each Latin American country, with a focus on duration 
and amplitude.  For each cycle, I calculate the increase in indebtedness using the information on 
gross issuance and the amortization characteristics of bonds and loans as well as the effects of 
defaults and restructurings.  Cycles in private and public gross issuance are then studied separately 
to examine their contribution to the boom-bust cycle in international gross primary issuance.4  The 
characteristics of these cycles are then compared across these two episodes of financial 
globalization.   Finally, I study the effects of idiosyncratic and global economic and financial 
conditions on booms and busts in international borrowing by the emerging periphery. 
The main results of the paper indicate that: 
First, although many have argued that cyclical monetary policy in the financial center since 
the 1970s is at the core of volatile and excessive booms and busts in capital flows to the emerging 
periphery, capital flow bonanzas and crashes are far more pronounced during the first episode of 
financial globalization when monetary policy in the financial center is constrained by the 
adherence to the Gold Standard.   
Second, the differences in the magnitude of the booms and busts of capital flows to the 
emerging periphery in the first and second episode of financial globalization are mainly driven by 
capital flow cycles around crises in the financial center.  During the first episode of financial 
globalization, capital flows during the bonanzas that precede panics in the financial center are 
about 60 percent larger than those bonanzas during tranquil times while capital flows during the 
busts that follow the crisis in the financial center are just half of those during tranquil times.  In 
contrast, international capital flows to the emerging periphery around crises in the financial center 
since the 1970s are characterized by smaller bonanzas and substantial more issuance during the 
bust.    
                                                          
4 This is an important contribution of this paper since while there is partial historical data on central government 
external debt there is no information on private external borrowing and debt. 
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Third, the changes in monetary regimes in the financial center (from adherence to the Gold 
Standard to autonomous monetary policy since the collapse of the Bretton Woods System) 
contribute to the time-varying characteristics of international capital flow cycles to the emerging 
periphery around episodes of crisis in the financial center.  Monetary cycles in the financial center 
are more pronounced when the financial center is at the epicenter of the crisis, with protracted 
contractions cutting short the bonanza episodes and persistent expansions injecting more liquidity 
in international capital markets during the busts.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides a short chronology of 
global capital flow cycles and Latin American countries’ participation in international capital 
markets.  Section III describes the new database as well as its sources.    This section also describes 
the construction of the data on international issuance and debt for the seven largest Latin American 
countries.   Section IV examines the characteristics of booms and busts in international gross 
primary issuance for each Latin American country.  This section also compares the borrowing 
cycles in both episodes, with especial attention to the magnitude of capital flow bonanzas and 
busts.   Section V examines the evolution of the domestic economy as well as world-wide shocks 
around the peak of the capital flow cycles to Latin America.  Section VI concludes. 
II. Global Capital Flows and Latin America’s International Borrowing, 1820-20155 
The first international capital flow bonanza starts in the early 1820s.  At the core of this 
cycle is the increase in liquidity fueled by the sharp decline in military spending following the end 
of the Napoleonic wars, with London as the new financial capital of the world.   This capital flow 
bonanza engulfs Europe, with Denmark, Russia, Spain, and a variety of independent Italian States 
(Naples, Piedmont, Tuscany, and the Papal States) floating bonds in London. This bonanza also 
spreads to Latin America.  All Latin American countries (except Puerto Rico and Cuba) gain 
independence from Spain and Portugal in the early 1800s.  The new independent countries 
immediately eliminate the restrictions to trade imposed on the colonies by Spain and Portugal.  
International trade starts and participation in international capital markets soon follows.  The first 
Latin American country to float bonds in London is Gran Colombia.  The first issue is in 1820 for 
                                                          
5 The chronology of capital flows and crises during the 19th and early 20th centuries is partly based on Bordo and 
Murshid (1999) and Marichal (1989).  The chronology of Latin America participations in international capital markets 
during the second episode of financial globalization draws in part from de la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler (2008). 
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547,784 British pounds.  By the end of 1825, Latin American’s total international issuance has 
reached 20 million British pounds.   
The boom ends in the summer of 1825 when the Bank of England raises the discount rate 
to stop the drain of reserves fueled by the import boom and the outflow of capital.  The tightening 
of liquidity is followed by a stock market crash in October, a banking panic in December, and 
numerous bankruptcies. The financial debacle in London rapidly spreads to continental Europe, 
with bankruptcies of major banks in Germany, Italy, Amsterdam, Saint Petersburg, and Vienna.   
The crisis extends rapidly to Latin America as overseas loans are cut off.  This is not all.  The crisis 
also triggers a major fiscal problem in Latin America.  As world trade collapses, so do tariff 
revenues, the only source of income of the governments of the new countries with Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, the Federation of Central America, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru defaulting starting 
in 1826.  
International issuance restarts in the 1830s.  This time around the United States is the most 
important borrower.  It is not the federal government but the U.S. states the ones at the heart of the 
capital flow bonanza.  By the end of the 1830s, nineteen U.S. states and two territories have issued 
bonds, with debt increasing by a factor of thirteen in just ten years.  Most of the debt is issued 
abroad, primarily in London (see English, 1996).   The bonanza also reaches European countries 
while Latin American countries, still in default, are not able to tap international capital markets in 
this period.   The boom ends in 1839 following the tightening of credit by the Bank of England, 
with the crash in international liquidity partly leading to the default of nine of the U.S. States 
starting in 1841.    
As with previous bonanzas, the collapse in international liquidity is quite prolonged, with 
international capital flows starting to recover only in the 1850s.  The capital flow bonanza now 
reaches not just Europe but also the Commonwealth countries (Australia, Canada, India, New 
Zealand, and South Africa).  Importantly, the world economy recovery starting in the late 1840s 
fuels a new boom in demand for primary products and raw materials, benefiting Latin American 
economies, in particular, Chile and Peru.6  The growing international trade accompanying the 
recovery in Europe fuels a new fiscal bonanza in all Latin American countries (as tariff revenues 
                                                          
6 The export of agricultural and mineral products surges dramatically: Guano from Peru, copper from Chile, wool 
from Argentina, coffee from Brazil, sugar and tobacco from Cuba, tobacco from Colombia, and silver from Mexico.  
See Marichal (1989). 
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increase accordingly) and with it the possibility of settlement of the foreign debts.7  Peru is the 
first to issue a new bond in London in 1853.  Still, the new loan boom to Latin America only 
flourishes in the 1860s after the end of the panic of 1857.8 
The capital flow bonanza to Latin America starting in the 1860s is larger than that of the 
early 1820s, with capital flows financing not just governments and the extraction of mineral 
resources but also the creation of banks and the adoption of cutting edge technologies such as, 
telegraphs and the construction of railroads.  The capital inflows to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay during the 1860s and early 1870s reach 132 million British 
pounds.  The world international capital flow bonanza slows down with the British crisis in 18669 
and even more with the crisis of 1873.  The end of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 plays a critical 
part in the unfolding of the crisis of 1873.  Following the defeat of Napoleon III, the new French 
government pays a huge indemnity of 5,000 million francs (200 million British pounds) to 
Germany.  These indemnity transfers lead to a massive flow of capital into the economics of central 
Europe, fueling speculation in various financial markets. A spectacular stock market crash in 
Vienna in May 1873 ends with the stock market boom in Austria and spreads rapidly to Germany.  
Between 1873 and 1878, half the Austrian banks close, and 400 of the 800 Austrian join-stock 
companies go bankrupt.  Stock markets in Amsterdam and Zurich also crash. The crisis crosses 
the Atlantic in September, the New York Stock market collapses and is followed with a U.S. 
banking panic.  As during the crisis of 1825, there is a collapse in world trade and in the prices of 
commodities and loans are called off.  Tax revenues in Latin America sharply drop and trigger a 
new wave of defaults across the region.  The steep decline in commodity and stock prices as well 
as the bank and industrial bankruptcies in most countries start the first worldwide 1873 recession.  
The crisis is also felt in the Middle East.   By 1876 the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, Greece, and 
Tunisia have defaulted.  In total, by the year 1876 fifteen non-European nations have suspended 
                                                          
7 Chile is the first to renegotiate its debt in 1842, Peru follows in 1849.  Most Latin American countries renegotiate 
their debts in the 1850s.   
8 The crisis of 1857 begins in the U.S. A railroad stock boom fueled by British capital and the California gold 
discoveries in 1849 crashes in August 1857 with a banking panic. The crisis spreads to England in the Fall.  From 
England, the crisis spread to the continent, with a serious panic in Hamburg in December. 
9 The crisis of 1866 is preceded by a large credit expansion both in England and France that triggers a boom in prices 
of intermediate goods, construction, and cotton-related industries.  The boom ends with the panic of 1866 when 
Overend & Gurney, a major discount firm in London, collapses.   France’s first investment bank, the Crédit Mobilier 
also fails. The crisis rapidly spreads to Spain, Italy, and Latin America.  
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payments on almost 30 million British pounds.  In Latin America, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and Uruguay default on their foreign debt. 
While the world depression of the 1873 wreaks havoc around the world, by the early 1880s 
a process of recovery has begun.  The upswing in world economic activity fuels foreign trade and 
new capital flows to countries in the periphery.  Again, as in the 1860s and 1870s, capital flows 
finance not just governments but also private activities in new industries, such as railways, 
tramways, construction of ports, gas works, and of course, they also finance the production of raw 
materials, mining, and land companies.  Latin America also benefits from this new capital flow 
bonanza.  From 1874 until late 1880s, international gross primary issuance by the seven largest 
Latin American countries reaches 280 million British pounds, with Argentina and Uruguay being 
the most important recipients.  The boom of the 1880s ends in 1890 with the crisis set off by the 
near-failure of Baring Brothers, the underwriter of Argentine Government loans.  The Bank of 
England prevents a panic via a recapitalization of Baring Brothers with the help of other major 
London financial institutions and loans from the Banque de France and Russia. Still, the crisis 
spreads back to Latin America with the cessation of British lending to Argentina and Uruguay. 
Between 1890 and 1894 Argentina, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela default.  A sharp worldwide decline in the flow of British capital follows this crisis, 
partly triggering major banking crises in the United States and Australia in 1893. 
The next international capital flow cycle starts in the late-1890s and ends with the start of 
WWI.10  While Britain continues to be the main creditor, France, German and American investors 
set up new companies in banking as well as in railways, tramways, mines, ports, sugar refineries, 
flour mills, gas works, water works, and even some early electric and telephone companies.  This 
episode is considered until now the heyday of financial globalization.  Latin American borrowing 
in international capital markets during this cycle reaches one billion British pounds.  The outbreak 
of World War I contributes to the end of this boom in international capital flows.  In July, as war 
becomes imminent, a liquidity crunch spreads around the world as investors start to liquidate 
                                                          
10 This boom is interrupted in 1907 with a crisis originating in the United States following the San Francisco 
earthquake in April 1906.  The destruction caused by the earthquake puts pressure on financial resources in the United 
States and puts strain on the Bank of England’s reserves when British insurance companies start to pay out the U.S. 
claims.  To stop the loss of reserves, the Bank of England hikes the discount rate from 3.5 to 6 percent causing a severe 
liquidity crunch in the United States.  The U.S. stock mark crashes in early 1907 and economic activity begins to 
decline. In October, depositor runs on trust companies spread to the commercial banks.  Banks suspend cash payments 
and the economy enters a sharp recession (See Bordo and Murshid, 1999).  
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foreign assets, fueling panics in all asset markets.  While the panic is promptly stopped by the 
central banks in the United Kingdom, the United States, and continental Europe, the outbreak of 
the war in Europe causes an abrupt suspension of capital flows.  Only Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, 
and Uruguay default.   This time around, the governments of most nations of the region continue 
to service their debt using export surpluses.   
Capital flows resume with the end of the war in Europe.   Increases in productivity due to 
major inventions, including electricity, automobiles, communications, and petrochemicals as well 
as, innovations in industrial organization lead to a boom in economic activity that spills over 
around the world.  Most Latin American nations benefit from the continuing rise in international 
prices of raw materials and primary products.  New York becomes the leading financial center 
while lending from London and Paris retrenches following the imposition of capital controls in 
Great Britain and France11 and capital markets in Germany collapse.   In 1927-1928 the Federal 
Reserve, concerned over stock market speculation, tightens monetary policy; a recession begins in 
July 1929.  Prices of commodities collapse, stock markets around the globe crash, and capital flows 
sharply decline, precipitating currency and banking crises in Latin America, Europe, and Australia.  
In September 1931, Great Britain abandons the Gold Standard and so does the United States in 
1934.  Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay default.   Barriers to capital flows are erected 
around the globe ending this first episode of financial globalization.  
During the next forty years, international capital flows languish amid restrictions to capital 
mobility in both developed and developing countries only to recover following the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods System.   Ironically, the revival of international capital markets can be traced to 
new financial restrictions in Great Britain and the United States in the late 1950s and 1960s.   In 
1957, the British government introduces new financial restrictions in the vain attempt to stop the 
speculation against the British pound.  In the end, the devaluation is not averted.  But the 
restrictions make London-based banks create a new market to avoid losing their share of financial 
transactions: Banks’ dollar deposits start to be used to provide dollar loans in an unregulated 
market, which becomes to be known as the Eurodollar market.  In 1964, it is the U.S. turn.  This 
                                                          
11  Foreign lending is formally restricted in Great Britain starting in December 1914.  While formal restrictions are 
removed in various stages and are eliminated in November 1919, foreign lending continues to be restricted by the 
Bank of England, with control undertaken through moral suasion.  As discussed in Cottrell (2005) all projected foreign 
flotations have to be discussed with the Bank of England’s Governor. 
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time, the currency under attack is the U.S. dollar.  To stop the speculation, the U.S. government 
introduces capital account controls in 1964.12  U.S. based-banks, like their British counterpart in 
the 1950s, turn to the Eurodollar market to avoid the restrictions that could imperil their operations, 
with liquidity in this market sharply increasing.    
But perhaps, the straw that broke the camel’s back is the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system in 1973.  With no need to defend the peg, countries can choose their own monetary policy 
without the need to restrict capital mobility and thus a new era of financial liberalization begins.  
As early as July 1973, United States eliminates capital account restrictions.  Germany and Great 
Britain follow, partially eliminating capital controls in 1973 while Japan joins in 1979.  In the late 
1970s, Latin American countries deregulate the domestic banking sector and eliminate restrictions 
on international capital flows. 
The first international market to develop in the 1970s is the syndicated loan market, 
particularly with lending to emerging markets.  The dramatic surge in international loans is 
triggered by the oil shock in 1973-74, with the high savings of OPEC countries being channeled 
through the Eurodollar market particularly during the 1979-81 period.  The boom in syndicated 
lending to emerging markets peaks at 57 billion dollars in 1981.  But in 1982 international issuance 
collapses.  At the heart of this collapse are the monetary contraction, recession, and the banking 
distress in the United States.   Mexico’s default in August 1982 adds to the fragility of the 
commercial banking sector in the United States.  With U.S. banks recalling their loans from all 
emerging markets, other defaults follow.  Most of Latin American countries suspend interest and 
principal payments and they are also followed by countries in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa.  
The rest of the 1980s witness a pronounced downturn in lending to emerging economies: Gross 
issuance of syndicated loans remains at half of the issuance reached in the early 1980s.  With all 
large U.S. commercial banks heavily exposed to the now emerging countries in default, the policy 
in the U.S. is to maintain current interest servicing by debtor countries to the U.S. banks, mostly 
by creating a new plan of “involuntary” loans from the exposed U.S. commercial banks while at 
the same time promoting continuous negotiations and extending the maturity of the loans.  This 
arrangement allows the banks to keep all their loans on the books at face value, even though they 
                                                          
12 In September 1964, the United States Congress enacts the Interest Equalization Tax (IET), an excise tax on 
purchases of new or outstanding foreign stocks and bonds by U.S. residents, which lower the rate of return to U.S. 
purchasers of foreign assets by an equivalent of 1 percentage point. 
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are heavily discounted in the secondary market.13   Monetary policy in the U.S. is also heavily 
relaxed to ameliorate the overall distress in the financial sector and reverse the downturn in the 
economy.   
The Brady plan and its initiative to restructure defaulted loans starting in 1989 end with 
the isolation of developing markets from international capital markets.14  This time around, both 
the government and the private sector start issuing bonds in international capital markets. Latin 
America benefits especially from the new international bond market.  In fact, issuance in the bond 
market surpasses that of the syndicated loan market, with Latin American countries bond issuance 
increasing from 2 billion dollars in 1990 to 84 billion dollars in 1997. 
The Brady plan also provides a new impetus to the syndicated loan market.  Helped by the 
easy monetary conditions in industrial countries in the early 1990s, syndicated loans reach a new 
peak at 190 billion dollars in 1997, almost four times higher than the level reached in the early 
1980s.  This time around, the largest beneficiaries in emerging markets are the East Asian 
countries, with gross issuance reaching almost 100 billion dollars in 1997.  The nationality of 
lenders also changes: While in the early 1980s most of the syndicates are composed of U.S. banks, 
in the 1990s Japanese and European banks play a leading role in lending to emerging markets, 
especially to East Asian countries.  The boom in the 1990s in the syndicated loan market is not 
confined to emerging markets.  By 2004 international syndicated lending has increased to 2.5 
trillion dollars, with developed countries capturing the lion share of the international syndicated 
loan market, with gross issuance reaching 1.8 trillion dollars in 2004.  Moreover, the expansion of 
the bond and syndicated loan markets in the 1990s is now accompanied by the development of an 
international equity market.  But the 1990s as the 1980s are plagued by crises.  In the aftermath of 
these crises, net capital flows to Latin America sharply decline with total issuance falling to about 
60 percent of its peak in 1997.   
The last wave of international lending starts in the early 2000s.  While capital flows to all 
emerging markets, the lion share continues to flow to advanced economies.  Total international 
issuance peaks in 2007.  Amid this boom, monetary policy is severely tightened, with the Federal 
Funds interest rate increasing from 1 percent in 2003 to 5 percent in 2007.  As with the bank crisis 
                                                          
13 See Sachs (1986) and Sachs and Huizinga (1987). 
14 The key innovation of the Brady Plan is to allow the commercial banks to exchange their claims on developing 
countries into tradeable instruments, allowing them to eliminate the debt from their balance sheets and creating almost 
overnight, a market for sovereign emerging market bonds. 
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in the United States in the 1980s, the U.S.  monetary policy is dramatically reversed following the 
panic in the financial centers.  The Federal Funds rate sharply declines to zero, and the money base 
surges, reaching about 25 percent of GDP.  Latin America international issuance is only transitorily 
affected by the 2008 Subprime crisis in the United States.  Latin America total international 
issuance increases until 2014 and peaking at 217 billion dollars, only to decline by 37 percent in 
2015.   
III. International Issuance: The Database 
The historical data for this paper forms part of a database I am constructing of international 
issuance of both the government and the private sector of all countries that participate in 
international capitals markets, including countries like Paraguay that floats a few bonds during the 
first episode of financial globalization to Australia that issues thousands of bonds and shares in 
international capital markets during the same period.  The historical data for this project has been 
collected over several years from financial newspapers of the 19th and early 20th centuries, annual 
reports of the Stock Markets in London and Paris, the Annual Listings of Bonds and Stocks in the 
Berlin, Frankfurt, and Hamburg Stock Markets, the archives of the London Stock market, the Paris 
Bourse, and the New York Stock Exchange, as well as the archives of merchant banks such as the 
House of Rothschild in London and deposit banks, such as the Credit Lyonnais in Paris.   I have 
also used publications from government agencies in the United States, such as the Department of 
Commerce and the Federal Reserve.   Part of the material has also been collected from important 
studies on sovereign debt by scholars in Latin America, Asia, and Europe.   This database is unique, 
it includes all issuance in all the financial centers from 1820 to 1931.    
The data contains information on each single issue.  For bonds, the data includes the date 
of the issue, the name of the borrower, the purpose of the issue, the type of business of the 
borrower, the amount issued, the price of the issue (whether it is issued at par/premium/discount), 
the interest rate and the maturity of the bonds, the banks underwriting the issue, the financial 
centers where the bonds are issued, and the currency of issue.  For shares, the data includes the 
date of the floating, the name of the company issuing the shares, the price of the shares, whether 
the shares are ordinary or preferred, and the financial centers where the shares are issued.  
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To introduce the historical data, I present two prospectuses in Figure 1.15  The first one is 
a 1,034,700 British-pound bond issued by the Province of Buenos Aires (Argentina) in 1870.  This 
is a 6% loan issued at a discount (88 percent of face value) redeemable in 33 years, with interest 
paid twice a year in London. This bond, as most sovereign bonds in the early phase of financial 
integration, is callable, allowing governments to refinance their debt in low-interest rate years.  
The second one is a 5% mortgage bond issued by the Railway Company Victoria to Minas in 
Brazil in 1911 for 25 million French francs redeemable in 89 years and issued in Paris. 
Although not shown in the photos that just include the top part of the prospectuses, these 
bonds are, like most of the bonds issued in the 19th and early 20th centuries, sinking fund bonds 
similar to current mortgage loans.  For example, the Buenos Aires 6% bond has an accumulative 
sinking fund of 1%.  The total annual service of this loan is 7% (1% for the sinking fund and 6% 
for the coupon rate) of the total amount issued.  For the 1,034,700 British pound bond, the annual 
service is equal to 72,429 British pounds.  As with mortgages, the service mostly pays the coupons 
in the first years of the life of the bond, with the part dedicated to the amortization increasing over 
time.  In the case of the Buenos Aires 6% bond, the service is partly used to amortize the bond by 
annual drawings of the bond at par.  More infrequently, bonds are bullet bonds, with the face value 
of the principal paid at maturity.   The information on repayment characteristics of the bonds is 
used to estimate net primary issuance (gross primary issuance minus amortization) and to construct 
series of both public and private debt.     
The information in the prospectuses, annual reports of the Stock Markets, or listings in 
financial newspapers when the bonds are issued only provides the originally planned repayment 
characteristics of the bond.  But most bonds are callable, allowing the borrower to repay earlier 
the bonds.  During the first episode of financial globalization, there are waves of refinancing in 
low-interest rate years, with old high-coupon bonds converted into newly issued low-coupon 
bonds.  To estimate net issuance and debt series, it is necessary to identify these conversions.  The 
original repayments of the bonds also change when the country defaults.  To estimate net issuance 
and debt it is necessary to study in detail the characteristics of the restructurings.  The 
restructurings of the debt following defaults for Latin America are described in Kaminsky and 
Vega-García (2016).  That paper only studies the defaults and the restructurings of the central 
                                                          
15 These photos only include the top part of the prospectuses. 
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government bonds.  This paper extends that research to bonds issued by Provinces, States, and 
Municipalities.  It also studies the conversions of bonds issued by private firms. 
The data on gross primary issuance that I construct captures access to international capital 
markets, that is, it only includes issuance for cash.16  As estimated, gross primary issuance does 
not include the value of the bonds issued in exchange for previously issued bonds via a conversion 
or an exchange of defaulted bonds for new bonds when the default ends.   Nor does it include 
bonds issued to pay accumulated coupon arrears when the debt is restructured to end a default.    
Finally, net primary issuance is estimated by subtracting cash amortizations from gross primary 
issuance.  In contrast, the debt series include the remaining value of all the bonds issued for cash 
as well as that of the new bonds issued in conversions or bonds issued in the aftermath of defaults 
to exchange the original bonds or to pay the accumulated arrears in coupons while eliminating the 
bonds converted.  That is, debt increases with new borrowing and the issuance of bonds to pay 
coupon arrears as well as with the issuance of conversion bonds and declines with both the 
amortization of bonds with cash payments or with the newly converted bonds.  
I construct a similar database for the second episode of financial globalization starting in 
1970.   As with the database for the first episode of financial globalization, the database for this 
period includes the bonds and shares floated in international capital markets.  It also includes 
international syndicated loans.  I follow the BIS in the identification of international syndicated 
loans (See, Gadanecz, 2004) and identify international loans as those loans in which the nationality 
of at least one of the syndicate banks differs from that of the borrower.17  The data are collected 
from the World Bank Archives as well as from Dealogic and Bloomberg.  Since most the countries 
in the sample defaulted, I collect data on the exchanges following the defaults from Bloomberg, 
the database of the International Finance Institute, the International Monetary Fund publications, 
and a variety of studies examining restructurings of debt, such as Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 
(2006).    
 
 
                                                          
16 All issuance is measured at face value. 
17 The database for both episodes does not include bonds/loans with maturity at issuance less than one year.  It does 
not include trade credits, and loans from public entities, such as foreign governments, or international institutions, 
such as the IMF and World Bank.   
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IV. International Borrowing Cycles: Then and Now 
Figure 2 first shows the newly collected data covering the period from 1820 to 1931.  This 
figure shows the international gross primary issuance of Latin America as captured by the issuance 
of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay.  These seven countries are the 
most active participants in international capital markets in the region during the first episode of 
financial globalization.  The top panel shows total gross primary issuance in British pounds, the 
middle panel decomposes total issuance into public and private issuance. Finally, the bottom panel 
shows the gross primary issuance/exports ratio to have a measure of participation in international 
capital markets relative to the size of the economy.  As shown in Figure 2, there are clear boom-
bust episodes throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries peaking around 1824, 1865, 1873, 1888, 
1910, and 1928.   
The boom of the 1820s is mostly due to loans to the governments of the newly independent 
countries.  International issuance of Latin American countries totals 20 million British pounds (at 
face value).  This episode also witnesses the creation of new companies in the mining sector.  In 
total, twenty-eight companies are formed with a proposed capitalization of 24 million British 
pounds.  However, by the time of the collapse in the summer of 1825, the shares issued amounted 
only to 3.5 million British pounds.  
The capital inflows to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay 
during the 1860s and early 1870s total 132 million British pounds.  It is during this period that 
numerous British banks are created following the laws in 1858 and 1862 allowing the formation 
of joint-stock banks with limited liability.  This is also the period of the creation of deposit banks 
such as the Credit Lyonnais (1863) and the investment banks (banques d’affaires) such as Banque 
de Paris et des Pays-Bas (1873), with both English and French banks founding new banks in 
continental Europe and Latin America.  In Latin America, The London and Brazilian Bank is the 
first to be incorporated in May 1862 with a capital of 1,000,000 British pounds; the London and 
River Plate Bank follows with a capital of 500,000 British pounds.  In 1863, the London and South 
American Bank limited is founded and merged with the Mexican Bank in 1864 to form the London 
Bank of Mexico and South America Limited with a proposed capital of 1,000,000 British pounds.  
Many others, such as the London and Venezuelan Bank, the Mercantile Bank of the River Plate in 
Uruguay, and the Anglo Peruvian Bank are created in this period.  It is also during the 1860s and 
1870s that the first joint-stock railway companies are formed.  Railway construction is financed 
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through issues of bonds, mortgage bonds, and equity issuance.  Some of the earlier issues are those 
of the Brazilian Street Railway in 1869, the Sao Paulo Railway in 1870, City of Buenos Aires 
Street Railway in 1870, and Buenos Aires National Tramways Limited also in 1870.  While the 
expansion is slowed down by the Overend Gurney crisis in London in 1866, by the early 1870s 
Latin American countries are heavily participating in international capital markets again.  In this 
episode, Peru becomes the most indebted country in Latin America, with its foreign debt increasing 
to 36 million British pounds in 1876 from 7 million British pounds in 1856.  The collateral 
provided by the exports of guano, monopolized by the Peruvian government, allows Peru’s 
government to access international capital markets in such grand way.   
After the crisis in 1873, the next lending cycle peaks in 1888.   From 1874 until the onset 
of the Baring crisis in 1890, the accumulated gross primary issuance of these seven countries 
reaches 280 million British pounds.   The next cycle of capital issuance peaks around 1910.  From 
1890 until the start of the first war capital flows to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, 
Peru, and Uruguay almost reach 1 billion British pounds.  A large part of international issuance 
finances the construction of railways and tramways, ports, gas works, and water drainages.  Other 
areas financed by international capital flows are land development, coffee and sugar plantations, 
production of nitrates, and general mining operations.  The last capital flow bonanza starts in 1918 
and peaks in 1928.  From 1918 to 1931, the accumulated total gross issuance by the seven countries 
totals about 600 million British pounds 
An important international finance literature on Latin American participation in 
international capital markets has been just concerned with sovereign borrowing.  Still, as shown 
in Figure 2 middle panel, private international issuance has been very important during this 
episode, with the private share oscillating around 46 percent, making it imperative to assess the 
contribution of private issuance to these cycles.   The share of private issuance changes over time.  
In the 1820s, private issuance is just 10 percent of total issuance.  In the 1860s and early 1870s, 
private issuance increases to about 30 percent of total issuance while in the 1880s private issuance 
reaches 55 percent of total issuance.  Private issuance at the turn of the century until the WWI is 
approximately 65 percent of total issuance while it declines to 20 percent during the last capital 
flow bonanza before the crisis of 1931.  During this episode, the correlation between public and 
private international issuance is almost 0.50, with private borrowing reinforcing sovereign 
borrowing cycles.   
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Information on total issuance is insufficient to compare the extent of financial integration 
during this episode. We need to scale total issuance with an indicator of the size of the economy.  
The most common indicator used to capture the extent of integration across countries is the ratio 
of total issuance (or capital flows) to GDP.   Official estimates of GDP for the 19th century and 
even the early 20th century are not available.  Instead, I use exports as the scale variable.18  Figure 
2 bottom panel shows the issuance/exports ratio.  Average issuance/exports is 15 percent during 
the first episode of financial globalization starting in 1820 and ending in 1931 with a peak at 121 
percent in 1824. 
Figure 2 also shows similar graphs for the second episode of financial globalization, 1970-
2015.  The top panel shows Latin America international gross issuance in US dollars.  This panel 
shows clearly three cycles with peaks in 1981, 1997, and 2014.  The second panel shows the 
decomposition of issuance into public and private.  As in the first episode of financial 
globalization, the first cycle is mostly about government borrowing.  In contrast, the bonanzas of 
the 1990s and the 2000s are on average 60 percent private issuance.  The bottom panel shows total 
issuance as a share of exports.  Interestingly, the capital flow bonanza of the 2000s is milder than 
those of the earlier periods when issuance is scaled by exports.   
I now examine in more detail the capital flow cycles for the seven countries in the sample.  
Figure 3 shows gross international primary issuance for each country as a share of exports.  The 
blue bars in this figure show international issuance (as a share of exports).  Data on issuance is 
quite volatile, in large part because government bonds are issued in big tranches.   To have a better 
visualization of booms and busts, the red line in Figure 3 also shows international primary issuance 
as a three-year moving average (as a share of exports).  As shown in Figure 3, during the first 
episode of financial globalization, booms and busts in international issuance across the seven 
countries are highly correlated, with mostly all countries participating in each cycle.19  There are 
two exceptions.  Following the boom of the 1820s, all Latin American countries default.  These 
defaults last around 30 years.  Following the debt restructurings mostly in the 1850s, Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay start tapping international capital markets again in the 1860s.  In 
                                                          
18 Exports are quite volatile.  For the issuance/export ratio to capture the volatility of capital flows only, I use trend 
exports as the scale variable.  Trend exports are estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
19 Uruguay is a province of Brazil during the capital flow bonanza of the 1820s, gaining independence in 1828.  It taps 
international capital markets for the first time in 1864. 
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contrast, Colombia and Mexico, amid serial defaults,20 are out of international capital markets until 
the beginning of the 20th century and the 1880s respectively.21  The figures for the second episode 
of financial globalization also show that cycles are highly correlated across the countries.  With 
the exception of Argentina following the default of 2001, all countries participate in the capital 
flow bonanzas of the 1970s, 1990s, and 2000s.    
I will now examine more systematically the boom-bust capital flow cycles, their duration 
and amplitude.  To identify the boom-bust cycles in gross international issuance, I apply the 
algorithm used to identify business cycles.22  The first step in the determination of the cycles is the 
identification of the cyclical turning points. The algorithm that I am going to apply looks for clearly 
defined swings in total issuance with at least a minimum duration similar to that of business cycles 
and a minimum issuance (as a share of exports) at the peak of the cycle of 15 percent.  Essentially, 
the algorithm isolates local minima and maxima in a time series, subject to the constraint on the 
length of upturns and downturns and the constraint of a minimum issuance at the peak of the cycle.  
I impose the restriction that the cycle cannot have duration of less than 5 years. That is, 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 
(international issuance as a share of exports) is a maximum if: 
                                              𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−2,𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1 < 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 < 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+1,𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+2                                             (1) 
and 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 is at least 0.15.23  The trough is identified as the minimum value between two local peaks.    
I apply this filter to the (3-year moving average) total issuance/exports ratio for each of the 
seven countries in the sample.  The algorithm identifies 34 cycles for the first episode of financial 
globalization and 22 for the second episode of financial globalization.  Table 1 shows the 
characteristics of these cycles.  The average duration of the capital flow bonanzas is 8 years across 
the two episodes.  For the first episode of financial globalization, the minimum boom duration is 
of 2 years and the maximum boom duration is of 18 years.  For the second episode of financial 
globalization, the minimum boom duration is 3 years and the maximum boom duration is of 13 
years.   Interestingly, the length of the bust during the first episode of financial globalization is 
                                                          
20 During the period 1826 to 1905 Colombia defaults 5 times, with Colombia being in default in total for 70 years.  
Mexico defaults twice, in 1827 and in 1854.  The first default last 25 years and the second lasts 33 years.   
21 Even in default, Mexico taps international capital markets in the 1860s during the French intervention from 1861 to 
1867.  During the intervention, the French government imposes Maximiliam I as emperor.  During this period, the 
government of Maximiliam I issues bonds in Paris. After the French intervention is defeated, Benito Juárez is re-
elected president and the loans contracted by the government of Maximiliam I are repudiated. 
22 See, for example, Bry and Boschan (1971), Harding and Pagan (2002), and Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008).  
23 I impose a minimum issuance of 15 percent of exports at the peak of the cycle to identify bona fide bonanza cycles 
and not just blips in issuance. 
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more varied.  The minimum duration of the bust is 2 years.  Capital flow crashes can last much 
longer.  For example, Colombia after the capital flow bonanza of the 1820s and amid serial defaults 
cannot tap international capital market for 79 years.  But long-lasting bust spells may be due to 
global patterns.   For example, following the Great Depression in 1931, barriers to capital flows 
are erected around the world with international capital markets disappearing for about 40 years.  
Latin American countries start tapping international capital markets only in the 1970s.   The 
duration of the crashes during the second episode of financial globalization is less volatile than 
that of the earlier episode, with the most protracted bust lasting 18 years (for Argentina following 
the default of 2001) and the shortest lasting 2 years.24 
To examine the magnitude of the capital flow bonanzas and capital flow busts, I need to 
estimate the accumulated net issuance during the boom and during a bust.25  I estimate the 
amplitude of the bonanza (bust) for each cycle i as follows: 
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Where 1 is the year when the capital flow bonanza (bust) starts.  For bonanzas, T is the year of the 
peak of the capital flow cycle and the numerator is total accumulated net issuance over the boom 
normalized by the level of exports in the year of the peak of the cycle.    For busts, T is the year of 
the trough of the capital flow cycle and the numerator is total accumulated net issuance over the 
bust normalized by the level of exports in the year of the trough of the cycle. 
I now examine whether capital flow bonanzas and busts can be classified into different 
varieties. 
IV.1 Varieties of Capital Flow Cycles 
This section studies and tests whether the characteristics of bonanzas and busts change 
from the first episode to the second episode of financial globalization.  It also examines whether 
capital flow cycles in the emerging periphery change depending on whether there is a crisis in the 
financial center.   As I discussed in the previous section, the first episode of financial globalization 
                                                          
24 Note that the last cycle for all countries is incomplete, so I cannot compute the complete duration of some of the 
cycles of the 2000s. 
25 Issuance includes both issuance of bonds and shares for the first episode of financial globalization and includes 
issuance of bonds, syndicated loans, and shares for the second episode of financial globalization. 
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was mired in panics with the financial center at its epicenter.  As examined in a variety of 
chronologies (see, for example, Bordo and Murshid (1999) and Kaminsky and Vega-García, 
(2016)), the most virulent crises in the 19th and early 20th centuries are the 1825 crisis in London, 
the 1873 crisis in continental Europe, the Baring crisis in London in 1890, and the London and 
New York 1929 crisis that heralded the Great Depression.   The second episode of financial 
globalization is witness to two worldwide financial crises with the financial center at its epicenter.   
The first crisis erupts in the United States in the early 1980s.  The crisis bursts amid the tightening 
in monetary policy in the United States and is preceded by a large boom in international lending 
to emerging markets by large U.S. commercial banks.26  This crisis spreads around the globe, 
triggering crises in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa.  The second crisis in the financial 
center erupts in 2008, the so-called U.S. Subprime financial crisis.   The crisis spreads to advanced 
economies around the world and almost triggers the collapse of the European Monetary Union.   
The crisis lingers for a decade with a collapse in economic activity around the world.  I classify 
the capital flow cycles around a crisis in the financial center as Systemic Capital Flow Cycles,27 
with all the cycles unrelated to panics in the financial center being identified as Idiosyncratic 
Capital Flow Cycles. 
I first examine the characteristics of cycles then and now.  Table 2 shows the amplitude of 
booms and busts (estimated as shown in (2)) in international borrowing.  For the first episode of 
financial globalization, 1820-1931, the average capital flow bonanza is quite pronounced, with 
total accumulated net issuance across all countries averaging 194 percent of exports.  Still, the 
amplitude of the cycles is quite varied with some bonanzas being extremely large and reaching 
almost seven hundred percent of exports and others much milder with accumulated total net 
issuance being just a fraction of exports during the cycle.   Interestingly, some of the most extreme 
capital flow bonanzas occur in the 1820s, with Colombia and Mexico’s bonanzas reaching seven 
and four hundred percent of their exports at the peak of the cycle. Not surprisingly, Colombia’s 
                                                          
26 The boom in international lending to emerging economies is not just a U.S. banking sector affair.  Japanese banks 
and U.K. banks and some other European banks also participate in the lending boom, although the large U.S. 
commercial banks are the ones most heavily exposed to emerging markets in this first boom in international lending 
since the 1920s.  See Sachs and Huizinga (1987).  
27 A capital flow cycle is identified as systemic if capital flow bonanza starts before the onset of the crisis in the 
financial center and the peak of the cycle occurs at the most five years apart from the year of a crisis in the financial 
center. 
20 
 
and Mexico’s default spells following this boom are the longest, with endless restructurings until 
their debt burdens reach sustainable levels.   
During the bust in capital flows, net issuance declines substantially to about 25 percent of 
exports.  Importantly, 30 percent of those busts are more extreme.  During these extreme crashes, 
countries are unable to tap international capital markets, with zero or even negative accumulated 
net issuance during the downturn in the cycle. The sharpest decline in issuance occurs in Peru 
following the 1873 world crisis.  At that time, Peru’s accumulated net issuance becomes negative, 
with the deleveraging reaching 58 percent of exports.  
The estimates in Table 2 for the episode of 1970-2015 paint a different picture of capital 
flow booms and busts.  The average capital flow bonanza for this episode is 113 percent of exports 
and only 60 percent of the average capital flow bonanzas in the earlier episode. In contrast, the 
average accumulated net issuance during the busts in the modern episode is larger than the one in 
the earlier period of globalization, with accumulated issuance during the bust averaging 38 percent 
of exports.  Interestingly, extreme crashes are less prevalent since the 1970s, only accounting for 
5 percent of all the cycles, suggesting better access of Latin American countries to international 
capital markets in bad times.   
Figure 4 tests whether capital flow bonanzas and busts in the earlier period are 
systematically different than those in the current period.  As shown in this figure, the null 
hypothesis of equal bonanzas in the first and second episodes of financial globalization can be 
rejected with a p-value of 0.01.  Bonanzas in the first episode of financial globalization are 72 
percent larger than those during the second episode of financial globalization.  The accumulated 
net issuance during the busts during the second episode of financial globalization is about 50 
percent larger than that during the first episode of financial globalization.  The null hypothesis of 
equality of busts across the two episodes can be rejected at a p-value equal to 0.09. 
I now explore whether capital flow cycles with bonanzas preceding panics in the financial 
center are different from those occurring during tranquil times.   Figure 5 tests this hypothesis for 
all the cycles during the first and second episode of financial globalization.  The data indicates that 
bonanzas leading to global crises are more dramatic than those during tranquil times.  The average 
systemic bonanza equals 186 percent of exports while the average idiosyncratic bonanza equals 
130 percent of exports.   The null hypothesis of equality is rejected at a p-value equal to 0.05.  
Interestingly, contrary to the current discussions on sudden stops and volatility of the capital flow 
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cycles following the crisis in 2008, busts following crises in the financial center are not different 
from those observed during tranquil times.  The p-value is equal to 0.25. 
Figure 6 examines whether the characteristics of systemic and idiosyncratic cycles change 
over time.   The first episode of financial globalization is witness to four major crises in the 
financial center: 1825, 1873, 1890, and 1929.   These crises are preceded by more extreme capital 
flow bonanzas.  The average bonanza in Latin America for cycles preceding panics in the financial 
centers reaches 226 percent of exports, with the average bonanza unrelated to these global panics 
only reaching 142 percent of exports.  As shown in Figure 6, the null hypothesis of equality of 
systemic and idiosyncratic bonanzas can be rejected with a 0.05 p-value.  The estimates shown for 
the episode of 1970-2015 paint a complete different picture of capital flow bonanzas.  The average 
capital flow bonanza to Latin America preceding the financial crises in the United States in the 
early 1980s and in 2008 only reaches 111 percent of exports and not far from the bonanzas in 
tranquil times, which average 115 percent of exports.  In fact, the null hypothesis of equality of 
systemic and idiosyncratic bonanzas during the second episode of financial globalization cannot 
be rejected at any conventional significance level (p-value equal to 0.44). 
Figure 6 also examines the characteristics of issuance during bad times.   Interestingly, 
during the first episode of financial globalization, countries have less access to international capital 
markets in the aftermath of a panic in the financial center when compared to idiosyncratic crashes.  
Following panics in the financial center, Latin American countries cannot access international 
capital market, with issuance during the bust only reaching 19 percent of exports.   In contrast, 
issuance during idiosyncratic busts reaches 35 percent of exports.  The Null Hypothesis of equality 
can be rejected at a 0.10 confidence level.   Interestingly, during the second episode of financial 
globalization Latin America countries issuance in the aftermath of crisis in the financial center 
reaches 59 percent of exports more than three times the issuance during idiosyncratic cycles that 
only reaches 15 percent of exports.  Again, the hypothesis of equality of issuance during busts in 
these two varieties of cycles can be rejected at all conventional levels (p-value equal to 0.00). 
The drivers of this different participation of Latin American countries in international 
capital markets may be many.  However, many have argued that monetary policy cycles in the 
financial center since the restart of financial globalization in the 1970s have been at the core of 
dramatic booms and busts in capital flows to emerging markets.  The evidence presented in Figures 
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4 and 6 for the two episodes of financial globalization suggests that we need to re-evaluate the role 
of monetary policy in the financial centers.   
The previous results focus exclusively on similarities and differences in access to capital 
markets over phases of booms and busts.  They leave unanswered questions about continuous 
access to international capital markets, the characteristics of the crashes, and overall volatility in 
access to international capital markets in the first and second episodes of financial globalization.  
To test whether international capital markets behave differently in these two episodes, I estimate 
separately the frequency distributions of annual capital flows in the 1820-1931 and 1970-2015 
episodes for each country and compare these two distributions using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test of equality of distributions.28  Figure 7 shows these results.  This figure first reports the 
histograms of annual international issuance/exports for the first and second episode of financial 
globalization for each country.  Note that in the first episode of financial globalization the 
histograms show fat tails, indicating many years of no access to international capital markets as 
well as many years in which countries can tap heavily international capital markets.  The 
histograms for the second episode of financial globalization suggest a more uniform distribution 
with similar probabilities of no access, mild access, and high access to international capital markets 
over the 45 years of the second episode of financial globalization.  The results from the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test are reported to the right of the histograms in Figure 7.  Note that in all 
cases, we can reject the null hypothesis of equality of the distributions at conventional significance 
values.   
V. What Fuels Capital Flow Cycles? 
The previous section has shown that capital flow cycles have changed over time.  Systemic 
capital flow bonanzas in Latin America have become much less dramatic and undistinguishable 
from the idiosyncratic ones.  Busts have also changed, with Latin American countries being able 
to tap international capital markets more often during bad times.  Still, the ability to tap 
international capital markets following panics in the financial center and in times of no crisis in 
the financial center has changed.  During the first episode of financial globalization, issuance in 
                                                          
28 The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test is a nonparametric test of the equality of probability distributions.  It can be used to 
compare a sample with a reference probability distribution (one-sample K–S test) or to compare two samples (two-
sample K–S test). The two-sample K–S test is a very useful nonparametric method for comparing two samples.  It is 
sensitive to differences in both location and shape of the empirical cumulative distribution functions of the two 
samples. 
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the aftermath of panics in the financial center is about half the issuance during busts in tranquil 
times.  In contrast, during the second episode of financial globalization, the ability to tap 
international capital markets in the aftermath of a crisis in the financial center is far larger than 
that in the aftermath of idiosyncratic bonanzas.   What is driving these differences?  Is it country-
specific economic conditions? Or are global factors?  This section examines the drivers of these 
differences. 
V.1 Global and Idiosyncratic Fundamentals 
To capture country-specific shocks, the “pull-factor,” I use two indicators: exports and the 
terms of trade of the Latin American countries.  Since Latin American countries start tapping 
international capital markets in the early 19th century and the data on GDP start later in the 20th 
century, I capture economic activity using exports.   Even data on exports are not readily available 
for the earlier part of the sample.  In many cases, the database on exports is constructed using the 
data on imports from the most important trade-partner countries.   For the terms of trade, I collect 
data on the prices of the most important exports of each of the countries in the sample and construct 
an export price index with weights capturing the time-varying share of each commodity export in 
total exports.  I use the wholesale price index of the United Kingdom to capture prices of imports 
for the first episode of financial globalization and the consumer price index of the United States 
for the second episode of financial globalization.   Figure 8 shows the evolution of country exports 
and the terms of trade.  The first section shows the historical data while the second section shows 
the data since 1970. 
To capture the “push factor,” I use indicators of global liquidity and world economic 
activity.  As is traditional in this literature, I capture cycles of global liquidity with interest rates in 
the financial center.  I use the bank rate in the United Kingdom for the first episode of financial 
globalization and the U.S. Federal Funds rate for the second episode of financial globalization.  To 
capture global shocks to growth, I construct a series of world imports, which I capture with total 
imports of the financial centers of each episode.  For the first episode, I use imports of France, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States.  For the second episode, I use imports of Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States.  The evolution of these indicators is shown in Figure 9, 
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first for the episode 1820-1931 and second for the episode 1970-2015.29   The vertical lines in 
Figure 9 identify the major panics in the financial centers in our sample. 
For the first episode, the top panel shows the U.K. bank rate.  This panel clearly shows that 
panics in the financial center are in part triggered by increases in interest rates.  These hikes in 
interest rates are short-lived.  The bottom panel shows the evolution of world imports.  Panics in 
the financial center are followed by persistent declines in world imports.  It takes 10 and 14 years 
respectively for world imports to recover to the pre-crisis level following the panics of 1825 and 
1931.    Not as long lasting, but still protracted, are the shocks to world imports following the crises 
of 1873 and 1890.  It takes 7 and 8 years respectively for world imports to reach pre-panic levels 
after these crises.  Importantly, part of the collapse of world imports reflects the long-lasting 
deflation following these crises, with import prices falling for at least 10 years.  
For the second episode, the top panel in Figure 9 shows the U.S. Federal Funds interest 
rate.  Again, crises in the financial center are preceded by hikes in the Federal Funds rate.  As for 
the first episode of financial globalization, these hikes in interest rates are reversed at the onset of 
crises in the financial center.  The bottom panel shows the evolution of world imports.  As in the 
first episode of financial globalization, the evidence since 1970 indicates that the world economy 
slows down more abruptly in the aftermath of panics in the financial center.   
To shed light on whether capital flow cycles may have different roots in the first and second 
episode of financial globalization or whether fundamentals behave differently in episodes with 
panics in the financial center (systemic episodes), I examine the evolution of these fundamentals 
around the peaks in international capital cycles of the seven Latin American countries in the 
sample.  Figure 10 examines capital flows in Latin America as well as the evolution of country-
specific factors (the “pull factors”) as captured by the growth rates of (real) exports and the terms 
of trade during idiosyncratic and systemic episodes.30  Each panel in Figure 10 portrays a different 
variable. In each panel, the horizontal axis records the number of years before and after the peak 
of the capital flow cycle.  I look at the behavior of each indicator for an interval of 10 years around 
                                                          
29 The database on macro fundamentals for the first episode of financial globalization was initially constructed for 
Kaminsky and Vega-García (2016).  The database on macro fundamentals for the second episode of financial 
globalization was constructed using data from WDI, the IMF database, and the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System database.   
30 For the first episode of financial globalization, I estimate real exports by deflating exports in British pounds with 
the U.K. price index.  For the second episode of financial globalization, I deflate exports in U.S. dollars with the U.S. 
price index.  Since exports and terms of trade are quite volatile, I estimate the growth rates of trend real exports and 
the growth rates of the trend terms of trade.    
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the year of the peaks in capital flows in each country (t).  In each figure, the solid line represents 
the average behavior of each indicator across all cycles while the dotted lines denote plus/minus 
one-standard-error bands around the average.  To examine whether Latin America countries’ 
international issuance and fundamentals behave differently around a crisis in the financial center 
in comparison to those episodes with no crisis in the financial center, Figure 10 shows two 
columns: the panels to the left show the behavior of all the indicators around the peak of 
idiosyncratic episodes (episodes with no crisis in the financial center) and the right panels show 
the same evidence for systemic episodes (episodes with crises in the financial center).  For all the 
variables, the vertical axis in each figure records the percentage-point difference between the value 
of each indicator during the 10-year interval around the peak relative to its sample mean.   
For the historical episode, the top two panels in Figure 10 show that capital flow cycles are 
far more pronounced in the episodes around a crisis in the financial center.  These more volatile 
capital flows around a crisis in the financial center are also accompanied by more volatile exports 
and terms of trade.  During systemic episodes, the capital flow cycle peaks at 93 percent of exports 
while it only reaches about 38 percent of exports during idiosyncratic episodes.  The next two 
panels show the behavior of the economy of Latin American countries as captured by the growth 
rate of trend exports (in real terms).  Both idiosyncratic and systemic bonanzas are accompanied 
by a growth boom, although it is substantially larger for idiosyncratic bonanzas.  Importantly, the 
economy in Latin America collapses after crises in the financial center, with the growth rate 
declining to about 5 percentage points below its sample mean.  In contrast, there is no collapse of 
export growth in the aftermath of idiosyncratic capital flow bonanzas, with the growth of exports 
during the capital flows busts being mostly the same as that of growth over the entire episode.  The 
last two panels show the growth rate of the terms of trade trend.  Again, these panels indicate that 
booms and crashes in commodity prices during systemic cycles are more pronounced than those 
during idiosyncratic cycles.  As shown in this figure, the boom in commodity prices is stronger in 
the years preceding crises in the financial center, with the growth rate peaking at 2 percent above 
the average rate.  Importantly, the bust in capital flows during systemic cycles is accompanied by 
a collapse in the terms of trade with growth rates declining to 2 percent below the average growth 
rate over the entire episode.  In contrast the cycles in commodity prices around idiosyncratic capital 
flow cycles only reach a maximum of about 0.3 percentage point and a minimum of -1.7 percentage 
points relative to the average of the sample.   
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Figure 10 also shows the behavior of issuance, exports, and the terms of trade during the 
second episode of financial globalization.  During this episode, the issuance cycles around crises 
in the financial center are very similar to those of an idiosyncratic nature with peaks reaching about 
30 percent of exports and far smaller than the peaks of systemic cycles during the first episode of 
financial globalization.  Interestingly, while capital flows in systemic episodes are not as volatile 
as those in the first episode of financial globalization, economic fundamentals booms and busts 
continue to be quite volatile with protracted downturns in the aftermath of panics in the financial 
center.  For example, as shown in the next panel, the growth rate of exports declines from about 5 
percentage points above the average to 7 percentage points below the average growth during this 
episode.  Similarly, terms of trade growth declines about 8 percentage points from the peak of the 
boom to the trough of the bust.  In contrast, export and terms of trade growth rates, after a short 
decline, recover during the bust in capital flows during idiosyncratic capital flow cycles.   
Figure 11 shows the evolution of global factors (“push factors”) around the time of the 
peak in capital flow bonanzas in Latin America.  This figure first shows two indicators of global 
liquidity.  The first measure examines the evolution of the interest rate in the financial center 
around the peak of the capital flow cycles in Latin America.31  The second measure captures the 
aggressiveness and persistence of changes in monetary policy by estimating the  3-year average 
percent change in interest rates over the capital flow cycle.  The last panels show the state of the 
world economy as captured by the growth rate of real imports of the financial centers.32  The 
indicators in the top and the bottom panels in this figure are shown relative to their average over 
the sample.  The first section of Figure 11 reports the evidence from the historical episode and the 
second one shows the modern episode. 
For the historical episode, the evidence from the top four panels indicate that interest rate 
changes in the U.K. are not at the core of booms and busts in international capital flows in Latin 
America.  Interest rates and interest rate changes (although they are somewhat volatile) are similar 
to the averages over the sample.  Naturally, during the Gold Standard period, the Bank of England 
has less room to conduct monetary policy or to become the lender of last resort.  The last panels 
                                                          
31 Since any meaningful measures of expectations of inflation for the first episode of financial globalization are 
difficult to come by, I use nominal interest rates to capture changes in monetary policy during both episodes of 
financial globalization.  The results are mostly unchanged when I use the real interest rate for the second episode of 
financial globalization. 
32 Again, as with exports, I estimate the growth rate of the trend of real imports. 
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capture economic activity in the financial centers.  Again, as in Latin America, the fluctuations in 
economic activity in the financial centers are far more pronounced when the center itself is in 
crisis, with growth rates declining by 4 percentage points between booms and busts in these 
episodes.   In contrast, idiosyncratic cycles in Latin America are accompanied by continuous 
growth in the world economy.    
The second episode of financial globalization presents a different picture about monetary 
policy in the financial center during systemic and idiosyncratic capital flow cycles.  As shown in 
the top two panels, interest rate fluctuations in the United States in episodes with no crisis in the 
center are quite small and not statistically different from their average during the sample.  In 
contrast, interest rate policy is more volatile at the onset of the U.S. banking crisis in the 1980s 
and the Subprime crisis in the 2000s.  The Federal Reserve raises interest rates from about 1 percent 
in 2003 to 5 percent in 2007.  Even more strongly, the tightening in monetary policy in the late 
1970s and early 1980s fuels an increase in the Federal Funds rate from 5 percent in 1976 to 16 
percent in 1981.  Importantly, following the onset of the crisis in the financial center, interest rates 
are sharply reduced, with interest rates declining from 16 percent in 1981 to 7 percent in 1986 
during the U.S. banking crisis in the 1980s and from 5 percent in 2007 to a range 0-0.25 percent 
five years later in the aftermath of the U.S. Subprime crisis.  These sharp increases in interest in 
the years preceding financial crises in the United States cut short the booms in international 
issuance, with the easy monetary policy in the following years ameliorating the collapse in 
international capital flows.   Interestingly, global economic activity volatility continues to be as 
pronounced around panics in the financial center as it is during the first episode of financial 
globalization.   
Table 3 also shows further evidence on interest rate fluctuations around times of global 
financial turmoil and compares them to those over the average of the episode.  The top panel shows 
two measures of volatility of interest rates: the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation.  
The clear message of this panel is that volatility during the first episode of financial globalization 
does not change during crises.  This is not the case since the 1970s.  Volatility during crisis in the 
financial center increases about 25 percent.  The top panel just examines annual fluctuations in 
interest rates.  However, around times of financial panics, interest rate changes can become highly 
correlated, with continuous increases preceding the onset of the crisis and continuous reductions 
in its aftermath.   The bottom table compares average changes of interest rates over 5-year intervals, 
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both for crisis times and for the entire episode.  For both episodes of financial globalization, panics 
are preceded by interest rate hikes and followed by interest rate reductions.  Interestingly during 
the first episode of financial globalization, hikes and reductions of interest rates around the onset 
of a crisis in the financial center are not very different from 5-year events over the entire episode.  
This is not the case during the second episode of financial globalization.  On average, 5-year hikes 
and reductions in interest rate during crises are about 85 percent higher than their averages during 
the entire episode.   
VI.  Conclusions  
Boom-bust cycles in international capital flows are hardy perennials.  Financial 
globalization erupts in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars with London at its center.  The next 
120 years are witnessed to a massive expansion of financial flows to every corner of the globe not 
just from London but also from Paris, Frankfurt, Berlin, and New York, the new financial capitals 
of the world.  Financial globalization collapses in the aftermath of the Great Depression when 
countries around the world erect barriers to international capital flows.  It takes about 40 years for 
capital flows to restart.  The collapse of the Bretton Woods System heralds the restart of financial 
globalization.  With floating exchange rates, countries can regain monetary autonomy without 
resorting to capital account controls.  Barriers to capital flows begin to be dismantled first in the 
financial centers and then in the periphery.  Financial globalization erupts again and so do boom-
bust cycles in international capital flows.     
Naturally, the literature on capital flows has grown dramatically.  One of the most studied 
topics are the triggers of booms and busts, with a focus on the pull and push factors and whether 
cycles are excessive and trigger financial crises.  This paper contributes to this literature with an 
important twist.  It examines capital flow cycles since the restart of financial globalization in the 
1970s and compares these cycles with those of the first episode of financial globalization.  This 
new database allows me to study the effects of changes in monetary regimes and crises in the 
financial center on capital flow cycles to the emerging periphery.  This paper also forms part of a 
new area of research on cycles of government indebtedness and banking credit booms spanning 
two centuries in Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and Schularick and Taylor (2012). 
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While the analysis of more countries participation in international capital markets is clearly 
necessary,33 the evidence from Latin America for the two episodes of financial globalization 
strongly indicates that capital flow bonanzas to the emerging periphery are far less pronounced 
since the 1970s than those observed during the first episode of financial globalization.   Moreover, 
it is not just about booms.   Crashes are also more dramatic during the first episode of financial 
globalization, with countries around the world losing complete access to international capital 
markets for years in a row.  At the core of these differences are the systemic boom-bust capital 
flow cycles to the emerging periphery as defined as those cycles that coincide with crises in the 
financial center.  In contrast, idiosyncratic boom-bust cycles to the emerging periphery are similar 
in these two eras of financial globalization.  The question is what drives these changes in the 
characteristics of systemic capital flow cycles.  The evidence presented above suggests that the 
change in the monetary regime in the financial centers is at the core of these changes.  Without the 
constraints of the adherence to the Gold Standard, monetary policy in the financial center becomes 
not just cyclical but also time-varying, with far more dramatic shifts implemented amid economic 
and financial distress in the center.   For example, the change in monetary policy in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s is preceded not just by high inflation but it is also preceded by a boom in 
international lending with U.S. commercial banks at its core.   In this environment, the sharp hikes 
in interest rates in the United States wreak havoc in international capital markets as basically all 
international lending at that time is contracted at a floating interest rate.   Many debtor countries 
are forced to reschedule their debts with the commercial bank creditors, substantially damaging 
banks’ balance sheets.  With banks’ exposure to the developing countries significantly exceeding 
the banks’ total capital, the odds of a major world financial crisis appear in the horizon.  To avoid 
a full blown up crisis, monetary and regulatory policies are implemented to keep the debtor 
countries servicing their debts to the commercial banks in the financial centers.  Interest rates are 
sharply reduced, commercial banks involuntary lending to debtor countries is implemented, and 
lax prudential standards are applied to banks heavily exposed to developing countries to allow 
them to carry those loans at book value, even when they are heavily discounted in the secondary 
markets.  Similar drastic policy measures are also implement before and after the U.S. Subprime 
crisis: the federal funds rate is increased from 1 percent to 5 percent in the mid-2000s and rapidly 
                                                          
33 I am finalizing the data on issuance and macro-economic indicators for about twenty other countries for the first 
episode of financial globalization to compare the cycles of capital flows then and now. 
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reduced to 0-0.25 percent following the onset of the crisis.  The crisis also triggers an 
unprecedented expansion of the U.S. money base.  These policies cut short international capital 
flow bonanzas and substantially increase international liquidity during the busts in international 
capital flow following the crisis in the financial center. 
Importantly, even with this plethora of policies implemented to stabilize financial markets 
before and after a crisis in the financial center, recessions in the financial center and the emerging 
periphery are as pronounced now as they were during the first episode of financial globalization.   
Many suggest that at the core of dramatic economic slowdowns in the aftermath of a panic in the 
financial center during the Gold Standard episode is the inability of central banks to be a lender of 
last resort and use monetary policy as a stabilizing tool. But is the movement to active monetary 
policy and the persistent injection of liquidity in the aftermath of a crisis in the financial center 
since the 1970s too much of a good thing?  Does this increase in leverage in the financial center 
contribute to the economic slowdown in the aftermath of financial distress?   The debate is still 
ongoing, with both supporters and detractors of these policies.  But what about the emerging 
periphery?  During the first episode of financial globalization the end of the systemic capital flow 
bonanzas to the emerging periphery is followed by waves of defaults.  Many argue that these 
defaults amid a collapse in international liquidity are at the core of the sharp slowdown in economic 
activity of the debtor countries.   Since the restart of globalization in the 1970s the experiences in 
the emerging periphery are diverse, still a common thread is the increase of leverage in the 
aftermath of distress in the financial center.   While the bonanzas of the 1970s and early 1980s are 
followed by early defaults in the periphery, continuous renegotiations and banks involuntary 
lending avoid debt forgiveness for about a decade, with leverage increasing dramatically over the 
1980s.   Many argue these lingering renegotiations and injections of liquidity for the debtor 
countries to be current on interest payments are at the core of the lost decade in Latin America.  
The experience in the aftermath of the Subprime crisis is different, developing countries do not 
default and continue tapping international capital markets in the aftermath of the panic in 2008, 
with leverage increasing in the emerging world too.  Is this at the core of the slowdown in the 
emerging periphery?  
Latin American countries are the quintessential prototype of emerging markets, making the 
findings in this paper quite general.  Still, a further analysis of a larger sample of countries 
including developed economies could help to untangle the route through which financial crises 
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with the center at its epicenter is transmitted to the periphery during both episodes of financial 
globalization. 
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Beginning Peak End Booms Busts Whole Cycle
1823 1824 1859 2 35 37
1860 1872 1877 13 5 18
1878 1888 1893 11 5 16
1894 1910 1919 17 9 26
1920 1927 1972 8 45 53
1823 1825 1856 3 31 34
1857 1864 1869 8 5 13
1870 1887 1891 18 4 22
1892 1896 1900 5 4 9
1901 1911 1917 11 6 17
1918 1927 1972 10 45 55
1821 1822 1856 2 34 36
1857 1867 1870 11 3 14
1871 1874 1879 4 5 9
1880 1889 1891 10 2 12
1892 1896 1901 5 5 10
1902 1911 1919 10 8 18
1920 1929 1974 10 45 55
1820 1824 1903 5 79 84
1904 1909 1914 6 5 11
1915 1928 1975 14 47 61
1823 1825 1862 3 37 40
1863 1865 1877 3 12 15
1878 1890 1892 13 2 15
1893 1909 1972 17 63 80
1822 1825 1860 4 35 39
1861 1873 1884 13 11 24
1885 1891 1903 7 12 19
1904 1911 1918 8 7 15
1919 1928 1972 10 44 54
1863 1864 1869 2 5 7
1870 1873 1880 4 7 11
1881 1889 1894 9 5 14
1895 1906 1974 12 68 80
Average 8 22 30
Uruguay
All Cycles
1820-1931
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
Peru
Table 1
International Capital Flow Cycles: Duration
Country
Cycles Duration
Beginning Peak End Booms Busts Whole Cycle
1972 1981 1989 10 8 18
1990 1997 2015 8 18 26
1972 1981 1990 10 9 19
1991 1997 2003 7 6 13
2004 2010 2015 7 5 12
1975 1981 1988 7 7 14
1989 1998 2007 10 9 19
2008 2013 2015 6 2 8
1972 1981 1992 10 11 21
1993 1996 2003 4 7 11
2004 2012 2015 9 3 12
1972 1981 1989 10 8 18
1990 1993 2007 4 14 18
2008 2013 2015 6 2 8
1972 1974 1977 3 3 6
1978 1982 1991 5 9 14
1992 1999 2001 8 2 10
2002 2014 2015 13 1 14
1974 1981 1989 8 8 16
1990 2000 2003 11 3 14
2004 2006 2009 3 3 6
2010 2015 6
Average 8 7 14
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Table 1
International Capital Flow Cycles: Duration
Country Cycles Duration
1970-2015
Notes: The database on issuance ends in 2015, thus the duration of the bust of the last cycle for Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru may be truncated .  For Uruguay, the duration of the bonanza of the 
last cycle may be truncated.  The average duration of the busts (cycles) when only complete cycles are included 
is 8 (15) years.
Colombia
Mexico
Peru
All Cycles
Uruguay
Beginning Peak End Bonanzas Busts
1823 1824 1859 1.69 -0.01
1860 1872 1877 1.97 0.35
1878 1888 1893 4.79 1.60
1894 1910 1919 2.29 0.57
1920 1927 1972 0.24 0.09
1823 1825 1856 0.90 0.08
1857 1864 1869 0.54 0.47
1870 1887 1891 1.75 0.56
1892 1896 1900 0.35 0.49
1901 1911 1917 2.56 0.66
1918 1927 1972 0.93 0.38
1821 1822 1856 1.56 -0.04
1857 1867 1870 0.84 0.09
1871 1874 1879 0.22 0.00
1880 1889 1891 1.41 0.00
1892 1896 1901 1.00 0.13
1902 1911 1919 0.98 0.27
1920 1929 1974 1.91 0.28
1820 1824 1903 6.88 0.88
1904 1909 1914 0.47 0.03
1915 1928 1975 2.29 -0.09
1823 1825 1862 4.30 0.00
1863 1865 1877 3.08 0.37
1878 1890 1892 3.97 0.44
1893 1909 1972 4.66 0.76
1822 1825 1860 3.39 -0.09
1861 1873 1884 3.46 -0.58
1885 1891 1903 0.58 -0.29
1904 1911 1918 0.78 -0.06
1919 1928 1972 0.94 -0.08
1863 1864 1869 0.51 0.11
1870 1873 1880 2.30 0.16
1881 1889 1894 1.91 0.28
1895 1906 1974 0.37 0.61
Average 1.94 0.25
Amplitude
Notes: Bonanzas capture the accumulated net issuance over the boom as a share of 
exports in the year of the peak of the cycle. Busts capture the accumulated net 
issuance over the bust as share of exports in the year of the trough of the cycle.
International Borrowing Cycles: Amplitude
Table 2
1820-1931
All Cycles
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
Peru
Uruguay
Argentina
Country Cycles
Beginning Peak End Bonanzas Busts
1972 1981 1989 1.31 0.92
1990 1997 2015 3.19 0.21
1972 1981 1990 1.34 0.70
1991 1997 2003 1.36 0.17
2004 2010 2015 1.21 0.88
1975 1981 1988 1.43 0.83
1989 1998 2007 1.26 0.12
2008 2013 2015 0.80 0.26
1972 1981 1992 0.88 0.94
1993 1996 2003 1.05 0.02
2004 2012 2015 0.78 0.60
1972 1981 1989 1.98 0.86
1990 1993 2007 1.09 0.19
2008 2013 2015 0.40 0.16
1972 1974 1977 0.67 0.21
1978 1982 1991 0.41 0.07
1992 1999 2001 0.59 -0.01
2002 2014 2015 1.36 0.12
1974 1981 1989 0.66 0.35
1990 2000 2003 1.31 0.21
2004 2006 2009 0.87 0.25
2010 2015 0.93
Average 1.13 0.38
Uruguay
Argentina
All Cycles
Notes: Bonanzas capture the accumulated net issuance over the boom as a share of exports in 
the year of the peak of the cycle. Busts capture the accumulated net issuance over the bust a 
share of exports in the year of the trough of the cycle.  The average amplitude of the busts 
when only complete cycles are included is also 0.38.
Table 2
International Borrowing Cycles: Amplitude
1970-2015
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
Peru
Country Cycles Amplitude
All Sample Crises All Sample Crises
Standard Deviation 1.06 0.94 3.79 4.73
Coefficient of Variation 0.27 0.26 0.69 0.83
Before After Tightening Easing
1820-1931 5.63 -5.19 6.03 -3.10
1970-2015 20.57 -20.35 10.85 -11.06
Notes: The first two columns in this table  show the average changes in 
the nominal interest rate for a 5-year episode before/after the year of 
the beginnng of a crisis in the financial center.     The year of the 
beginning of the crises in the financial center are 1825, 1873, 1890, and 
1929 for the first episode of financial globalization and 1981 and 2007 
for the second episode of financial globalization.    The next two columns 
show average 5-year episodes changes in the interest rate over all the 
sample.  I separate the episodes into tightenings/easings according to 
whether the 5-year averages are positive or negative.  
Episodes
Table 3
Central Bank Interest Rate Fluctuations
Crisis Times All Sample
1820-1931 1970-2015
Volatility
Tightenings and Easings during Crises in the Financial Center
Notes: Crisis episodes are defined as the year of the crisis in the financial 
center and the 10-year episode around the crisis.
Figure 1
Prospectuses
Private
Figure 2
Public
Notes:  International Issuance is Gross Primary International Issuance
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Capital flow bonanzas (busts) during the first episode of financial globalization
Capital flow bonanzas (busts) during the second episode of financial globalization
Bonanzas Busts
1.94 0.25
1.13 0.38
0.01 0.09p-value
Notes: Capital Flow Bonanzas (Busts) capture the accumulated net issuance over the boom (bust)  as a share  of exports in the year of the peak (trough) of the cycle   The amplitude of the capital flow bonanza 
(bust) as a share of exports is shown on the horizontal axis.  Each capital flow bonanza (bust) is identified on the vertical axis with the name of the country and the year of the peak of the capital flow cycle. The 
test below the figure shows the one-tailed p-value at which the Null Hypothesis of equality of capital flow bonanzas and busts in both episodes of financial globalization can be rejected.  
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Are International Borrowing Cycles Changing?
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Capital Flow Busts: Then and Now
Systemic capital flow bonanzas (busts)
Idiosyncratic capital flow bonanzas (busts)
Bonanzas Busts
1.86 0.33
1.30 0.26
0.05 0.25p-value
Notes: Capital Flow Bonanzas (Busts) capture the accumulated net issuance over the boom (bust)  as a share  of exports in the year of the peak (trough) of the cycle   The amplitude of the capital flow bonanza 
(bust) as a share of exports is shown on the horizontal axis.  Each capital flow bonanza (bust) is identified on the vertical axis with the name of the country and the year of the peak of the capital flow cycle. The 
test below the figure shows the one-tailed p-value at which the Null Hypothesis of equality of capital flow bonanzas (busts)  in systemic and idiosyncratic episodes can be rejected.  
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Are Systemic and Idiosyncratic International Borrowing Cycles Different?
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Capital Flow Busts: Systemic and Idiosyncratic
Systemic capital flow bonanzas (busts) 
Idiosyncratic Capital flow bonanzas (busts) 
Bonanzas Busts Bonanzas Busts
2.26 0.19 1.11 0.59
1.42 0.35 1.15 0.15
0.06 0.10 0.44 0.00
Idiosyncratic
p-value
Notes: Capital Flow Bonanzas (Busts) capture the accumulated net issuance over the boom (bust)  as a share  of exports in the year of the peak (trough) of the cycle   The amplitude of the capital flow bonanza 
(bust) as a share of exports is shown on the horizontal axis.  Each capital flow bonanza (bust) is identified on the vertical axis with the name of the country and the year of the peak of the capital flow cycle. The 
test below the figure shows the one-tailed p-value at which the Null Hypothesis of equality of capital flow bonanzas (busts)  in systemic and idiosyncratic episodes can be rejected for each of the episodes of 
financial globalization.
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Are Systemic and Idiosyncratic International Borrowing Cycles Changing?
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Figure 7
Frequency Distribution of International Issuance/Exports
1820-1931 1970-2015
Notes: This figure shows the histogram of gross international issuance (as a share of exports) of each country in both episodes of financial globalization.  The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a nonparametric test of the equality of probability distributions.  The KS test p-values at the right of each country histograms show the 
p-values at which the Null Hypothesis of equality of the distributions can be rejected.  
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Figure 8
Notes:  
The red lines are the logarithms of exports in British pounds.   The blue lines 
are the terms of trade indices with base 1900=100.  Exports are measured on 
the right axis and the terms of trade are measured on the left axis.
See the text for the definitions of the indicators. 
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Uruguay
Notes:  
The red lines are the logarithms of exports in US dollars.   The blue lines are the 
terms of trade indices with base 2005=100.  Exports are measured on the right 
axis and the terms of trade are measured on the left axis.
See the text for the definitions of the indicators.
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Figure 9
The Push Factors
(Logarithm of Imports in British Pounds)
U.K. Short Term Nominal Interest Rate
(in Percent)
World Imports
Notes: The U.K. short-term interest rate is the Bank rate.   World imports in the bottom panel are the imports of 
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States in British pounds.  The vertical lines identify the years of crisis 
in the financial center. See the text for the definitions of the indicators.
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Notes: The U.S. short-term interest rate is the Federal Funds rate.   World imports in the bottom panel are the 
imports of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States in U.S. dollars.  The vertical lines identify the 
years of crisis in the financial center. See the text for the definitions of the indicators.
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The Push Factors
(Logarithm of Imports in U.S. Dollars)
U.S. Short Term Nominal Interest Rate
(Percent Per Annum)
World Imports
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Notes:  Latin American countries international issuance is shown as a percent of exports.  The growth rate of exports is the growth rate of trend real exports.  The growth rate of the terms of 
trade is the growth rate of trend terms of trade.  The three indicators are shown relative to their sample average (in percentage points).  Year t  is the year of the peak of the cycle. The solid 
line is the average behavior of each indicator across all  cycles.  The dotted lines are the plus/minus one-standard error bands around the average.  See the text for the definitions of the 
indicators.
Figure 10
The Pull Factors during Idiosyncratic and Systemic Capital Flow Cycles
1820-1931
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Notes:  Latin American countries international issuance is shown as a percent of exports.  The growth rate of exports is the growth rate of trend real exports.  The growth rate of the terms of 
trade is the growth rate of trend terms of trade.  The three indicators are shown relative to their sample average (in percentage points).  Year t  is the year of the peak of the cycle. The solid 
line is the average behavior of each indicator across all  cycles.  The dotted lines are the plus/minus one-standard error bands around the average.  See the text for the definitions of the 
indicators.
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The Pull Factors During Idiosyncratic and Systemic Capital Flow Cycles
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Notes:  The U.K. interest rate is the Bank rate.  The Percent change in the U.K. interest rate is three-year percent change in the UK interest rate  in percent per annum.  World imports in the 
bottom panel are the imports of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States in British pounds deflated by the U.K. wholesale price index.      The U.K Interest rate and world imports 
are shown relative to their sample average.  All the figures are in percentage points.  Year t  is the year of the peak of the cycle. The solid line is the average behavior of each indicator across 
all cyles.  The dotted lines are the plus/minus one-standard error bands around the average. 
Figure 11
The Push Factors During Idiosyncratic and Systemic Capital Flow Cycles
1820-1931
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Notes:  The U.S. interest rate is the Federal Funds rate.  The Percent change in the U.S. interest rate is three-year percent change in the U.S. interest rate  in percent per annum.  World imports in 
the bottom panel are the imports of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States in U.S. dollars deflated by the U.S. consumer price index.      The U.S Interest rate and world imports are 
shown relative to their sample average.  All the figures are in percentage points.  Year t  is the year of the peak of the cycle. The solid line is the average behavior of each indicator across all cyles.  
The dotted lines are the plus/minus one-standard error bands around the average. 
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The Push Factors During Idiosyncratic and Systemic Capital Flow Bonanzas
1970-2015
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